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Large systems-of-systems (SoSes) are typically made up of a federation of 
existing systems and developing systems interacting with each other over a network to 
provide an enhanced capability greater than that of any of the individual systems within 
the system-of-systems. Service-oriented architecture (SOA) and the supporting Web 
Services (WS) technology hold promise to create SoSes that are interoperable, 
composable, extensible, and dynamically reconfigurable. The DOD has mandated the 
basic WS framework standards to be used in the development of its services for use in the 
Global Information Grid (GIG) and Network Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) 
programs.  Service-level compositional techniques such as choreography, orchestration, 
dynamic invocation, and brokering, are used to create complex dependencies between 
web services belonging to different organizations. These services, however, can be 
exploited by rogue users when the services have localized or compositional flaws. 
Investigating incidents of misuse of web services requires that dependencies between 
service invocations be retained in a neutral and secure manner so that the alleged activity 
can be recreated in an undeniable way while preserving evidence that could lead to and 
support appropriate prosecutorial activity.  Material evidence currently extractable from 
web servers such as log records and XML firewall alerts from end-point services do not 
have forensic value because defendants can rightfully claim that they did not send that 
message and that the plaintiff fabricated or altered the log record to deceive the court. In 
order to facilitate and base such investigations on reliable infrastructure that can convince 
judicial systems, Wijesekera et al. propose designing Forensic Web Services (FWS) that 
preserve appropriate evidence to recreate the composed web service invocations 
independent of the parties with a vested interest in the transactional messages [1]. 
This report describes a framework to provide on-line forensic capabilities to 
service oriented architecture via FWS and runtime execution monitoring. Section 2 lists 
the requirements of FWS. Section 3 summarizes the FWS proposed by Wijesekera et al. 
Section 4 describes the use of runtime execution monitoring to examine the transactional 
evidence for complex transaction scenarios involving multiple web services. 
 
 
2. Forensic Web Services Requirements 
 
In this report, we address three high-level requirements for forensic web services. 
 
(1) Trusted third party over a secure and reliable environment 
It is essential that the forensic data are collected and processed by an independent, 
trusted third party. We can build upon the extensive research on Trusted Third Party 
(TTP) protocols to establish non-repudiation of the data collected by the FWSes. 
Moreover, the FWSes should run over a secure network layer that provides: 
(a) authentication of all parties involved, 
(b) confidentiality and integrity of the communication channels, and 
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(c) reliable messaging over the communication channels.  
 
(2) Pair-wise evidence logging with time stamping 
The essential task of the FWS is to collect evidence of transactions that occur 
between pairs of requester WS and server WS at the time of invoking the service. All 
transactional evidence collected by the FWS must be time-stamped to include: 
(a) service request time – when the requester sends a message to the server 
according to the requester’s clock,  
(b) service response time – when the server sends the reply to the requester 
according to the server’s clock,  
(c) service request time-out – when the FWS sends the requester an attestation to 
the server’s failure to respond to the service request within the time allowed 
according to the FWS’s clock, 
(d) server availability time – when the FWS sends the server an attestation to the 
server’s availability according to the FWS’s clock.  
 
(3) Comprehensive evidence generation 
On demand, the FWS will, in collaboration with other FWSes, compose 
transactional history of complex transaction scenarios involving multiple web services 
that occurred during specific periods and met specific transactional patterns. 
 
 
3. The Forensic Web Services Framework 
 
The FWS framework is made up of a set of collaborating FWSes, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. To access the services of a registered FWS system, a web service queries the 
FWS registry and then uses the location information to register with the FWS. Any client 
requesting services of a web service must re-route its transactional messages through its 
FWS agent (called the operator FWS), which acts as a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that 
monitors the service requests (and corresponding responses) involving its client. For 
example, the web services WS-A, WS-B and WS-C have selected, respectively, FWS-1, 
FWS-2 and FWS-3 as their operator FWS in Figure 1. The following are necessary for 
FWS systems to function as required: 
(1) There should be a message format for communicating WS-Forensics layer messages 
and storing them in the FWS servers. 
(2) All web services must re-route their transactional messages through FWS servers. 
(3) The WS call stack must be enhanced with a WS-Forensics layer. (See Section 3.4 for 
details.) 















Figure 1. The FWS Framework 
 
 
3.1 Format for the WS-Forensics Messages 
 
WS-Forensics uses the message format of <#session|#message|#ds:SignatureK( 
#session|#message/sequence|#message/envelope)> to exchange between sending WS, FWS 
and receiving WS. Here the session element identifies a WS-Forensics conversation, and 
message corresponds to an element carrying the actual upper layer message along with its 
sequence number (message/sequence) in the conversation. For instance, sequence number 
2 corresponds to a response message if message exchange pattern type (MEPType) is 
two-way and the protocol is the Simple Evidence Layer Protocol (SELP) [2]. At each 
endpoint, either the sender or the receiver signs the session, message/sequence, and 
message/envelope parts of the message in the ds:Signature element of the message. 




    <p1:session id="session" protocol="#SELP" > 
        <p1:sessionID algorithm="URI"> 
            <p1:id>uuid:212131313131232323222</p1:id> 
        </p1:sessionID> 
        <p1:MEPType>Two-Way</p1:MEPType> 
        <p1:agreement> 
            <p1:agreementID algorithm="URI"> 
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                <p1:id>www.contracts.com/#231322323123132132</p1:id> 
            </p1:agreementID> 
        </p1:agreement> 
        <p1:partners> 
            <p1:sender> //www.portalservices.com 
            <p1:fwsttp> //fws-2.forensicwebservice.com 
            <p1:receiver> //www.weatherservices.com 
        </p1:partners> 
    </p1:session> 
    <p1:message > 
        <p1:timestamp>2002-10-10T12:00:00-05:00</p1:timestamp> 
        <p1:sequence id="sequence">1 </p1:sequence> 
        <p1:envelope id="envelope">$EnvelopeFromUpperLayer$</p1:envelope> 
    </p1:message> 
    <p2:Signature> 
        <p2:SignedInfo> 
            <p2:Reference URI="#session" > 
            <p2:Reference URI="#sequence" > 
            <p2:Reference URI="#envelope" > 
        </p2:SignedInfo> 
        <p2:SignatureValue> 
        <p2:KeyInfo> 
    </p2:Signature> 
</p1:fwsMessage>  
</soap:Body> 
Listing 1: A Sample FWSMessage [1] 
 
3.2 WS-Forensics Messages Recording 
 
WS-Forensics FWS stores the messages in two formats, LogRecordIndex (LRI) 
and LogRecord (LR), as shown in Listing 2. A LRI refers to the record of a single 
fwsMessage within a WS-Forensics conversation. LR stores entire WS-Forensics 
sessions including all fwsMessages delivered to and/or generated by the FWS. LRI 
records are used for two purposes: (1) for quick searches and (2) for keeping track of the 
location of the entire LR. Each LRI is stored at both FWSes (operator and non-operator 
FWS). LR, on the other hand, is stored only at the operator FWS and can be reached 
using the LRIs that refer to it. 
A FWS storing a LRI sets the value of its status field to that of the 
message/sequence part of the fwsMessage. The FWS also sets the timestamp with the 
value of message/timestamp part of the fwsMessage and the recordinfo with the value of 
session part of the fwsMessage. The envelope and ds:signature parts are not represented 
in LRIs but in LRs. LR contains the recordIndex part that has the final timestamp and 
status values of the conversation to timestamp and sequence values of the last 





    <p1:timestamp>05:00</p1:timestamp> 
    <p1:status>1</p1:status> 
    <p1:recordInfo protocol="URI"..> 
        <p1:sessionID algorithm="URI"/> 
        <p1:MEPType>string</p1:MEPType> 
        <p1:agreement/> 
        <p1:partners> 
            <p1:sender/> 
            <p1:fwsttp/> 
            <p1:receiver/> 
        </p1:partners> 
    </p1:recordInfo> 
</p1:logRecordIndex> 
<p1:logRecordIndex ..> 
    <p1:timestamp>05:01</p1:timestamp> 
    <p1:status>2</p1:status> 
    <p1:recordInfo protocol="URI"/> 
</p1:logRecordIndex> 
<p1:logRecordIndex ..> 
    <p1:timestamp>05:02</p1:timestamp> 
    <p1:status>3</p1:status> 
    <p1:recordInfo protocol="URI"/> 
</p1:logRecordIndex> 
<p1:logRecord …> 
  <p1:recordIndex> 
    <p1:timestamp>05:02</p1:timestamp> 
    <p1:status>3</p1:status> 
    <p1:recordInfo protocol="URI"..> 
      ... 
    </p1:recordInfo> 
  <p1:recordIndex> 
  <p1:fwsMessage> 
    <p1:session/> 
    <p1:message/> 
      <p1:timestamp>05:00</p1:timestamp> 
      <p1:sequence>1</p1:sequence> 
      <p1:envelope>...</p1:envelope> 
    <p1:message> 
    <ds:signature/> 
  </p1:fwsMessage> 
  <p1:fwsMessage> 
    <p1:session/> 
    <p1:message/> 
      <p1:timestamp>05:01</p1:timestamp> 
      <p1:sequence>2</p1:sequence> 
      <p1:envelope>...</p1:envelope> 
    <p1:message> 
    <ds:signature/> 
  </p1:fwsMessage> 
  <p1:fwsMessage> 
    <p1:session/> 
    <p1:message/> 
      <p1:timestamp>05:02</p1:timestamp> 
      <p1:sequence>3</p1:sequence> 
      <p1:envelope>...</p1:envelope> 
    <p1:message> 
    <ds:signature/> 
  </p1:fwsMessage> 
 </p1:logRecord> 
LRI for fwsMessage Seq.1 
LRI for fwsMessage Seq.2 
LRI for fwsMessage Seq.3 
 
Listing 2: Sample LRI and LR records [1] 
 
 
3.3 WS-Forensics Messages Routing 
 
Routing transactional information through FWS servers requires that all 
transactions be reliably intercepted and routed. As stated, FWS servers gather pair-wise 
transactional evidence that flow between sender and receiver web services, using the 
Simple Evidence Layer Protocol (SELP) [2]. There are four entities involved in the 
process: sender, receiver, operator FWS, and non-operator FWS. Operator FWS refers to 
a FWS selected by either party to manage the steps listed below (illustrated pictorially in 
Figures 2 and 3), and the Non-operator FWS belongs to the other party.  
(1) FWS receives MsgSeq.1 (<#session|#message|#ds:SignatureSender-K(#session|“1”|#env)>). 
(2) Validates, stores the message, creates an LR and LRI for MsgSeq.1 and notify non-
operator FWS.   
(3) MsgSeq.1 is forwarded to the Receiver and starts a timer.  
(4) If the response MsgSeq.2 cannot reach the FWS before timing out then MsgSeq.-1 
(<#session|#message|#ds:SignatureFWS-K(#session|“-1”|#env)>) is signed by the FWS; it is 
stored and sent back to the Sender and an LRI is created and sent to the non-operator 
FWS.  
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If MsgSeq.2 (<#session|#message|#ds:SignatureReceiver-K(#session|“2”|#env)>) arrives on 
time and passes the contractual validity test, it is forwarded to the sender and stored in 
FWS along with notifying the non-operator FWS with its LRI.  
If MsgSeq.2 fails the contractual validity test, then MsgSeq.-2 
(<#session|#message|#ds:SignatureFWS-K(#session|“-2”|#env)>) is signed by the FWS; it is 
stored and sent back to the Sender and an LRI is created and sent to the non-operator 
FWS.  
(5) FWS creates, signs and sends MsgSeq.3 (<#session|#message|#ds:SignatureFWS-K 
(#session|“3”|#env)>) to the Receiver. It also stores the message in the LR and sends 
the LRI to the non-operator FWS.  
 
 
Figure 2. An Operator FWS managing the SELP protocol [1] 
 
 
Figure 3. An Operator FWS storing messages [1] 
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3.4 Enhanced Web-Services Call Stack 
 
The existing WS call stack consists of a three layers:  The bottom layer consists of 
the SOAP1 messages; the middle layer consists of WS-Secure Conversations; and the top 
layer consists of the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) specifications. SOAP 
and WSDL are part of the basic WS framework standards. SOAP provides the standard 
language for messaging format used by the service and its requestor, while WSDL 
provides the standard language for describing the point of contact for a service provider 
(a.k.a. the service endpoint or just endpoint), the public interface of an endpoint (i.e., the 
way the requestors should communicate with the service provider), and the physical 
address of the service. 
Wijesekera et al. propose to add a forensic layer in between the middle layer and 
the top layer to reroute transactions through the FWS servers (Figure 4), and have a 
sender process and a receiver process sitting in front of each web service endpoint 
(Figure 5). 
 




Figure 5. FWS-Handler Module Architecture (adapted from [3]) 
 
                                                 
1 SOAP initially stood for Simple Object Access Protocol.  When W3C adopted SOAP as a standard, 
the acronym was considered misleading and therefore dropped in favor of just SOAP. 
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The Sender Process FWS-Handler captures the SOAP message from the upper layer and 
encapsulates the message in the WS-Forensics message format by adding signatures, 
routing the message to the operator FWS and so on, and submitting the result to the WS-
SecureConversation/WS-Trust handlers shown in Figure 4.  
The Receiver Process: FWS-Handler handles the WS-Forensics fwsMessage from the 
lower layer. After validating the signature according to the WS-Forensics session context 
the handler extracts the original SOAP message and either passes it to another handler (if 
such handler exists) in the chain or dispatches it to the intended service|portype|operation 
entity. 
 
3.5 Security Requirements for Underlying Layer 
 
WS-Forensics is designed to run over a secure layer with following services:  (a) 
authentication of all parties involved, (b) confidentiality and integrity of the 
communication channels, and (c) reliable messaging over the communication channels.  
Two properly implemented standards, WS-Trust [4] and WS-SecureConversation 
[5], satisfy these requirements. WS-Trust issues, renews and verifies tokens to support 
the verification of message  confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and so on. WS-
SecureConversation builds secure sessions using XML encryption and signature.  
The processes described in Section 3.4 require secure channels between endpoint 
web services and FWS nodes. The steps below show how a WS-Forensics message, 
fwsMessage, traverses from a sender to a FWS and subsequently to a receiver. 
(1) WS-SecureConversation/WS-Trust handler of the sender grabs the fwsMessage. The 
handler then builds a secure conversation by means of the Security Context Token 
(SCT) obtained from the Security Token Service (STS). FWS nodes also may have 
this role. The fwsMessage is encrypted by WS-SecureConversation and then pushed 
into the transport layer to be sent to the FWS node through the conversation  
(2) WS-SecureConversation/WS-Trust handler of FWS node receives the encrypted 
SOAP message, decrypts it, extracts the actual fwsMessage, and pushes the message 
into the WS-Forensics layer to be processed as described in the next section. 
(3) After processing the fwsMessage, the FWS node pushes the message to its WS-
SecureConversation/WS-Trust handler to build another secure conversation with the 
receiver as described in the first step. Then the message is encrypted by the security 
handler, to be sent to the receiver through the conversation. 
(4) WS-SecureConversation/WS-Trust handler of the receiver receives the encrypted 
SOAP message, decrypts it, extracts the actual fwsMessage, and pushes it into the 
WS-Forensics layer to be dispatched. 
 
3.6 Pair-wise Evidence 
 
The SELP protocol and FWS event logs retain the evidence to verify the 
following claims, mapped to messages in Table 1:  
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• Evidence of Origin (EOO): attestation of message send-time and origin. 
• Evidence of Delivery (EOD): message acceptance by the intended receiver 
and the acceptance time. 
• Evidence of Failure (EOF): attestation of message not acknowledged by 
intended receiver within time allowed. 
• Evidence of Availability (EOA):  attestation of server’s availability in a 
specific time interval.   
• Evidence of Agreement Violation (EOV): attestation of contractual violation 
by the server.  
Evidence Type Signer FWS Implementation 
EOO Sender of message MsgSeq.1 and MsgSeq.3 
EOD Receiver of message MsgSeq.1 and MsgSeq.2 
EOF FWS MsgSeq.-1 
EOA FWS MsgSeq.0 
EOV FWS MsgSeq.-2 
Table 1: Notation for Evidence Types 
 
4.  Transactional Evidence Generation 
 
The creation of comprehensive evidence of a misuse scenario requires the 
examination of pair-wise transactional evidence stored in multiple FWSes for interesting 
sequencing behaviors, which are behaviors that consist of sequences of events, conditions 
and constraints on data values, and timing. In its vanilla form, sequencing behavior 
specifies sets of legal (or illegal) sequences, such as the following automotive body-logic 
requirement: 
Once engine is turned off, compartment lights must be on until driver door is 
opened. 
Sequencing behavior has two types of common constraints: 
(1) Timing constraints – describe the timely start and/or termination of successful or 
forbidden computations, such as the deadline of a periodic computation or the 
maximum response time of an event handler. For example, 
The sqrt() function must complete its computation and return an answer within 
200 milliseconds from the time it is called. 
(2) Time-series constraints – describe the timely execution of a sequence of computations 
within a specific duration of time. For example,  
Whenever the system load (L) exceeds 75% of the MaxLoad, L must be reduced 
back to 50% of the MaxLoad within 1 minute and must remain at or below 60% of 
the MaxLoad for at least 10 minutes.. 
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In this section, we describe the use of MSC-Assertions to specify interesting 
behavior of event sequences and runtime execution monitoring to both examine and 
construct the transactional evidence for complex transaction scenarios involving multiple 
web services. 
 
4.1 Expressing Sequencing Behavior as Message Sequence Chart Assertions 
 
MSC Assertions are a formal language extension of UML Message Sequence 
Charts (MSCes) superimposed with UML statecharts [6]. They have the look and feel of 
UML MSCes and UML statecharts, yet they are formal and executable. For example, 
unlike UML MSCes, MSC Assertions provide for distinguishing between events that can 
occur and those that must occur. In addition, MSC Assertions are capable of specifying 
infinite sets of scenarios.  
MSC Assertions are based on Statechart diagrams superimposed on MSC 
diagrams and augmented with Java (or C++) conditions and actions. For example, Figure 
6 shows the MSC Assertion for a time-bound requirement of a travel agent service:  
R1: The travel agent must obtain bids from at least two airlines and two hotels 
and return a flight and a hotel matching the customer’s request within 30 seconds 
from the time the customer issues his travel request.  
The MSC Assertion of Figure 6 looks, for the most part, like a UML MSC, but it 
enjoys the following unique features: 
(1) An MSC Assertion is written from the standpoint of an observer, and can be used for 
runtime monitoring of the target application.  Consider for example the message 
reqFlight(Flight f) sent from the Travel Agent to Airline #1. While a UML MSC 
might consider an interpretation where this event is generated by the Travel Agent, 
for an MSC Assertion, it is meant that the MSC Assertion should monitor-for, or 
listen-for, this event flowing from Travel Agent to Airline #1. Note that while the 
Travel Agent service may send out many requests to different airlines for bids, the 
MSC Assertion only needs to observe two of such requests to satisfy the requirement 
R1.  
(2) An MSC Assertion allows loops and transitions back up the vertical task bar. In 
Figure 6 for example, the Travel Agent will return to the Waiting state if the condition 
aBidCount ≥ 2 && hBidCount ≥ 2 is false. This feature is in contrast to UML MSCes 
where a vertical task bar represents a timeline and where clearly a task cannot move 
back in time. An MSC Assertion however, considers a vertical task bar as a 





on entry/bSuccess = false;
System.err.println(










































TRTimeoutSimulatedTime timer = 
                 TRTimeoutSimulatedTime(30, this);
int aBidCount = 0;
int hBidCount = 0;
/*Local Variables*/
boolean rightFlight(Flight f) { 
  if (f.date  != req.flight.date) return false;
  if (f.flight  != req.flight.flight ) return false;
  return true;
}
boolean rightHotel(Hotel h) { 
  if (h.date  != req.hotel.date) return false;
  return true;
}
[true]





Figure 6. A MSC Assertion for the Travel Agent Service [6] 
 
(3) States and actions. As discussed above and as illustrated in Figure 6, an MSC 
Assertion task might contain both implicit and explicit states. The purpose of explicit 
states is to specify actions, which are code snippets (written in Java or C++, 
depending on the code generator chosen) to be performed, such as aBidCount++ or 
rightFlight(Flight h). For example, the Customer will remain in its implicit initial 
state until the event request(Req r) is observed leaving the Customer. The Customer 
then enters the Watching state. The Customer will remain in Watching state until 
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either the event response(Flight f, Hotel h) is observed arriving at the OK state, or the 
timeout event is detected. 
(4) Java/C++ underlying language and code generation. An MSC Assertion is a 
diagrammatic representation of a Java or C++ class that implements the requirement 
as a monitor. Hence, all variables and functions declared in the local-variables boxes 
of Figure 6 are actually properties of this generated class.  
(5) Parameterized events. An MSC Assertion event can contain objects as actual 
parameters. In Figure 6, the transition annotated with the message bidFlight(Flight f), 
from Airline #1 to the Travel Agent, is sent with some Flight object as an argument. 
Condition guards range over local properties and event arguments (e.g., 
rightFlight(f)). 
(6) An MSC Assertion is an assertion. It uses the same approach described in [6] for 
assertion statecharts where it announces a success or failure for every witnessed input 
scenario. It does so using the built-in bSuccess property. The boolean bSuccess is true 
by default. The developer assigns bSuccess=false as an action wherever s/he wants 
the assertion to fail. The JUnit test-case then inspects this property to decide whether 
a particular test-run failed.  
Figure 6 realized requirement R1 as follows. First note that, in the style of the 
UML MSC notation, the assertion contains six tasks, denoted by the six vertical task bars. 
Also, the assertion contains local variables timer, aBidCount, and hBidCount, as well as 
two Boolean functions rightFlight() and rightHotel() for  checking the correctness of the 
itinerary. The MSC Assertion monitoring starts as a request(Req r) event is observed 
from the Customer task to the Travel Agent task while the Customer task is in its implicit 
inital state. The 30 second timer is triggered and the Customer task enters its Watching 
state. The Customer will remain in Watching state until either the event response(Flight f, 
Hotel h) from the Travel Agent task (while the latter is in its Complete state) or the 
timeout event is detected. If the Customer receives the response() message before the 
timeout event, it will enter the OK final state. If the Customer task does not receive the 
response() message before the timeout event, the timeout event will cause the Customer 
task to enter the Error final state; bSuccess will be set to false indicating the violation of 
the requirement. 
The Travel Agent task will remain in its Init state until it receives the event 
request(Req r), then it will transition to the Bidding state.  The Bidding state consists of 
three concurrent threads, in the style of the UML statechart threads [6]. The Travel Agent 
task will remain in the Waiting state until it has received at least two airline bids and two 
hotel bids.  It will then transition to the Complete state where the MSC Assertion is ready 
to observe the event response(Flight f, Hotel h) from the Travel Agent task to the 
Customer task. Clearly, the Travel Agent task must ensure that the bids received indeed 
satisfy the customer’s request. This constraint is manifested as a condition guard 
righFlight(f) or rightHotel(h) on the message transition. (N.B.:  MSC Assertion message 
transitions have the same event[guard]/action look and feel as UML statechart 
transitions.) 
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Since we are not interested in the detailed temporal behavior of the Airline tasks 
and Hotel Network tasks in the requirement R1, we treat these tasks as black boxes. The 
MSC Assertion only observes the fact that each of these tasks returns a bid to the Travel 
Agent task only after they have received a request for bid from the Travel Agent task as 
follows. Each of these four tasks remains in its Init state until it receives the request for 
bid message from the Travel Agent task. It then enters its implicit working state. It will 
transition from its working state to its implicit terminal state when the MSC Assertion 
observes that the task returns a bid to the Travel Agent task.  
 
4.2 Runtime Execution Monitoring 
 
Runtime Execution Monitoring of formal specification assertions (REM) is a class 
of methods for tracking the temporal behavior, often in the form of formal specification 
assertions, of an underlying application. REM methods range from simple print-statement 
logging methods to runtime tracking of complex formal requirements (e.g., written in 
temporal logic) for verification purposes. The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) used REM for the verification of flight code for the Deep Impact 
project [7]. In [8], we showed that the use of runtime monitoring and verification of 
temporal assertions, in tandem with rapid prototyping, helps debug the requirements and 
identify errors early in the development process. Recently, the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) adopted REM as the primary verification method for the new ballistic missile 
defense battle manager because of REM’s ability to scale as the size and complexity of a 
system increase, and its support for temporal assertions that include realtime and time-
series constraints [9]. 
 
4.3 Creating Evidence for Scenarios 
 
As stated, the main objective of the FWS Framework is post-mortem 
investigations on inter-dependent scenarios containing more than one party in a 
comprehensive manner, which can be accomplished using the following process: 
(1) Define the boundary of scenario generation by specifying the web services being 
investigated (called suspected web services) and the time period of the scenario. 
(2) Create a MSC-assertion to describe the sequencing behavior of interest involving the 
suspected web services. Add calls to exception-handlers in the Error flowchart box of 
the MSC Assertion to collect the event sequence causing the failure whenever the 
MSC Assertion fails during execution of the web services. 
(3) Use the FWS-Registry to locate the FWS Trust Third Parties holding the LR records 
of any pair-wise transactions involving the suspected web services. 
(4) Retrieve the pair-wise transaction evidence for the specified time period from the 
FWS TTPS. 
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(5) Re-create the interactions using a discrete event simulator, and use to exercise the 
MSC-assertion statecharts as runtime execution monitors to collect evidence leading 
to the failure of the assertions [10]. 
 
Figure 7. A MSC Assertion for Detecting and Collect Price Fixing Evidence 
 
For example, suppose we suspect that Hotel Networks 1 and 2 are involved in a 
price fixing scheme and want to collect evidence of such activities. We can create the 
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MSC-assertion shown in Figure 7 to detect and record all reqHotel messages between the 
two hotel networks from the time when one of the hotel networks received a reqHotel 
message from the Travel Agent to the time when the last of the two hotel networks 
returned a bid to the Travel Agent. The statechart assertion sets the boolean suspicious to 
true if it detects such communication and reports the evidence when the scenario 
terminates in either the OK state or the Error state. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this report, we discussed the need to preserve appropriate evidence to recreate 
the composed web service invocations independent of the parties with a vested interest in 
the invocations. We presented a framework to provide this capability as a web service to 
other web services by logging service invocations at the appropriate level of detail, and 
the use of MSC Assertions and runtime monitoring to automate the generation of 
transactional evidence for complex scenarios. Our next step is to develop the necessary 
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